semcnce» then almou all of hi* theorie* ein be undentood in »urpriiiiigly simple and consmcm tertm, Accordingly, I *hall make an initial ittp in ihi* papcr towards thc subitamiation of dm sypposition by tmerpreting and imerrelaung *ome oi ihr fundamental dwinctiont which *erve to itrueture all three Critiquet.
Thc root distinction» underlytng direcdy or indirecdy all oihcrs in Kam'* Criucal philosophy i« that betwccn 'knowledge* (Erlcenntnb) and 'exprrience* (£if*i*r*ng), Yct unfortunatcly, in tpitc of (or perhapi, because of) iu ubiquity in Kam'* wriüngs, it tcnds 10 rcnuin an obicure and uncricicacd pmuppoiiiion for boilj Kant and his many interpreten and critici, The main reaion for ihii ntglrct *wm 10 be tlut hc invokrs a variety of distinctiont which define kno^edge and cxperirnce morc pnrmely* widi ihe result that the more comrnon lenns naturally appcar 10 bc lei$ icchnical and in no nccd of spccial treatmmt. The purpo^e of ihis papcr will be to esplicaie tlie knowlcdgcexpcricnce diitincüon whieh i$ implicii in Kant'f System by integraüng ii wiih the most importani of these more obvtously Technical diiiinction*: fir$dy wirft hii pure-anplrical and $ubjea*objcct dbtinction$ f secondly wiih hi« a priori-a posteriori and analytic· synthctic distinciions, and thrrdly wiili his divtinctiom between cmpirical, uanvccndental, logical, and practical rcflcction.
An imponam limitation must be placed on the scope oi thu paper if iu lask i$ to bc madc practicable: I will be unable to givc an cxtiausuve account of any one term or distinction. Conscqucntly, the dctails of the .irgwmr/;/^ of Kant and his critics for and against the Icgiiimacy of his usage ^411 have to be largcly neglected« I regard ihis äs a necessary limitation because -especially in light of Kam's own cmphasis on ihc 'architcctonic unity* of his System 1 -an Interpreter can judge fairly äs to thc cxient oi an argument's validity only afur he has an adequatc undersunding of thc ovcrall coniext into which it fits* Ahhough this does not mcan that carclessly gcncral or cvcn incorrcci Statements will bc cxcusable, it doci mean that l will havc to ignorc or only bricfly mcntion sornc minor amb!guities f and that thc many mcticulous stxidics which havc bccn made on most of die relevant distinctions will bc of Icss usc than if l wcrc focusing my attcntion morc narrowly. But this limitation certainly has its advantagcs. For all too frcqucntly, äs Wolff points out, "thc Utcrature on Kant has somcwhat thc air of a multitudc of rcports from thc blind ^Hse mcn who cncountcrcd thc clcphant, Each onc teils of thc part on which his hands happcncd to fall, but a carcful readcr might fail to rccognizc thc bcast from thcir descriptions". 4 Limiting thc discussion to gcncral considcrations will not only dccrcasc thc likclihood of falling into this predicamcnt hcrc, but should also incrcasc thc possibility of providing a 'map 1 of thc general contour of Kant's philosophy, thc usc of which can help us to avoid such onc-sidcdncss whcn invcstigating morc spccific aspccts of his System in the future.
Tlic wide ränge of connotations which thc terms 'knowlcdgc* and 'expericncc* havc in ordinary languagc might inducc an Interpreter to regard any sccondary distincuons with suspicion. He might insist that they must incvitably share thc indistinct naturc of Stepben PalmquUt ihc pririury dminction from which thcy are derived, notwithstanding any intelligibility they seem to have on their own. Such a proposal, however, is unsoimd; for, a$ I shall actempt to dcmonstrate, Kant'* own explanations of bis icrms can bc imcrprctcd in a relativcly clear and plausible fashion. Moreover, evcn though hc doe* not $ay much about knowledge and cxperience AS such, hc does say enough to supply u$ with a sufficiemly coherent starting point.
In ordinary use, 'cxpcricnce' can refer gcnerally to a subject's immediatc encounter with an object. This 'immediatc experience' is indcpendent of the functions Kant calls 'determinant judgment' and 'refiective judgment', for in such expcricnce the subject has neither determined the given object to be an object of knowledge nor reflected upon its cpistemological Status.* Kant uses the word in this way when, for example, he begins the Introduction to the first Critique with the proclamation: There can be no doubt that all our knowledge begins with experience/ Several sentences later he adds that, although 'all our knowledge begins with experience, it does not follow that it all arises out of experience.' That is, all knowledge must be part of someone's immediate experience in order for it actually to be known at all^ yet this does not preclude the possibility that certain aspects of our knowledge might be derived from some other source. In any case, Kant uses the word 'experience' in this ordinary, indeterminate and nonreflective sense throughout his Critical works.
But in explaim'ng how some knowledge is grounded in a source other than immediate experience, Kant develops another, less typical, meaning for 'experience'. He describes this more determinate type of experience äs a concrete 'synthesis of perceptions 77 in which various Objects of possible experience'' are made actual objects of knowledge through the cooperation of the subject's two main powers of cognitive judgment: intuitive sensibility (which produces Sensation) and conceptual understanding (which produces thought). 9 This process, known also äs determinant judgment, implies a differentiation between two kinds oi knowledge:
10 the validity of 'empirical' knowledge is determinable only by appealing at some point to sensible experience, 11 while that of 'pure' knowledge is determinable without reference to sensibility, to the extent that 5 Kr. d. U., pp. 385-386. 6 Bl;cf. A601/B629. 7 A701/B729, B161. I B73. 9 A 50/B 74.1 will not attempt in this paper to explain what Kant means by these terms, which he uses to describe the stages through which experience passes. Some of these stages would themselves be called 'experience' in ordinary language (e.g. conscious acdvity which is not focused on a given object, or the perception of an object which does not enter fuily into conscious thought). But Kant would regard such 'experience' äs 'merely subjective', and would give it some other name, such äs Imagination' or 'apprehension* (see e.g. A115-128). 10 That Kant replaces his initial explanation of this distinction with a clearer version in the second edition of the first Critique reveals his increasing awareness of the importance of specifying technical meanings for his primary distinction between knowledge and experience. II B 2-3; cf. A 2 and A20/B34. 'therc i* nothing that belongs 10 semation' in h, M Kam claitm thsu cropirital kno* Jctigc ii tied $o cbicly to expcricnce that thc two ean, for uv» l>c cquatcd: 'Empirica! knowledgc h cxpcrieneeV' In thi* nrw *tnse (developcd fully onJy in thc wond edition of thc firit Critiqut), expcrirncc i* no longer the immediate chrtmological itarting point of all knowledge, but onc of Kvrral **pecies of knöwJedgeV* Unlike cmpiricaJ knowledgc, pure knowledgc U relatcd only indirectly to exprricnce: it ansei out of thc subject*$ abstraa rcfleaion on thc gcnml naturc of his rxprricnce» 1 * and ii pure in vinuc of tts primär)' dcpendencc on thc subj'ect rathcr t!un ihc object of knowledgc« 1 * But in ordcr to cngage in *uch rcflection f wc mu$t be consciou^ly aware of our cxperience, not in its immcdiate state, bat a$ etnfiritAlknmkiige; for expcricntc in ittelf'i* 'thc ultimatc unconditional givcn f within which all reflection arises'J* So far, Kant's u$c of thc wordf *knowlcdgc* and 'expericnce* itcrns 10 bc relativ cly clcar. Tlic lattcr rcfcrs cithcr to the original cncountcr bctween subjcct and object (i.e. 'immediate experience') which ytclds actual knowlcdge through dcterminant judgmcnt, or to thc 'cmpirical knowledgc* which h so produccd; and thc formcr refers eithcr to this samc empirieal knowledgc, or to ihc knowledgc which can be infened from experience by rcflccting in othcr, morc absiract ways. But this account of his primary dtstinction will bc of usc to thc intc reter only if it providcs an adcquatc contcxt for inicrprcting Kam's sceondary distinetions. In $II f thcrcforc, I will introducc the four classes of knowledgc which arisc out of two of his secondar)* distinciions, aftcr which l will examinc in §11! thc types of reflection which lead to such knowledgc, Hnally, in § IV I will integratc ihc various r<»ults of this inquir> f imo a singlc picture, dclineating thc cssential pcrspcctival pattern which dctermines ihc form of Kant*$ Critical System. u A20/B34 -A21/B35; cf. A50/B74. Kant could havc avoidcd usmg the word 'empirical 9 for both hts pure-cmpirical and his cmpiricol-iransccndcntal (scc §111) distinaions simply by replacing it in thc former casc wiih 'impurc*, Altcrnativcly, it might have been cvcn better for him to havc identified pure knowledge with knowledgc by refleciion -i.e. wiih knowledgc which arises out of thinking about experience, whethcr or not it requires ihe Intuition of an objcct in an actual experience. The pure-empirical distinction would thcn dissolvc into a contrast bctwcen nonrcflective experience (cmpiricÄl) and knowledgc by rcfiection (pure), much likc the one I shall dcvelop in this paper. Although any type of reflection would be regarded äs yielding pure knowledgc, differcnt Mcvels* of purity \iOuld havc to be discerned (e. g. trän-sccndcntal, empirical, ctc), Howcvcr, sincc Kant does not use his ternis in this manncr, ncither shall L 13 B 165-166; see also B H7 and B218, 14 Bxvii, A157/B196. 15 A260/B316-A263/B319. 14 B 5-6. Some reflective knowledge is, äs wc shall see in §111, neither pure nor cmpirical, but an 'admixture' of both (B 3 The knowlcdgc-cxpcricncc diuinction is rarciy di$cu$scd äs such by cithcr Kant or his commenutors bccause, äs mentioncd abovc, expcrience (cvctt though ir has chronological priority in its irnmediate form) is dcfincd in terms of knowledge, Despite thc ncgligiblc attcntion it has becn givcn t howevcr, thi$ distinction will turn out to-form thc context in which all Kam's other distinctions are $et, But before this can bc fully dcmonstrated, a good dcal rnore will havc to bc said about thc 'knowledge' sidc of thc distinction. In this scction, thcrefore, I wiJJ specify how.four basic types of knowlcdgc arise out of thc two most prcvalent of Kant's secondary distinctions, thc a priori-a posteriori and thc analytic-synthctic, both of which are conccrned not only with Knowledge, but with thc various ways reflective knowledge and immediatc cxperience are related.
On the surface, the bifurcation of knowledge into a priori and a posteriori types scems to be readily comprehensible. A posteriori knowledge is knowledge derived directly from -or the truth of which is contingent upon -the meeting of subject and object in experience. A priori knowledge, on the other hand, is 'given' or 'innate' knowledge which is derived from a source -or the truth of which is -'absolutely independent of all experience'; 18 hence it is both necessary 1 * and universal. 20 But upon closer investigadon, two problems arise: first, How does this distinction differ from that between pure and empirical knowledge? and second, If *alj our knowledge begins with experience', then what sense is there in saying that a priori knowledge is somehow 'independent of all experience'? I will consider these questions in the following two paragraphs.
Although Kant ordinarily uses the terms 'pure* and 'a priori', äs well äs the terms 'empirical' and 'a posteriori' interchangeably, they should not be regarded äs mere synonyms, 21 for he does occasionally stress a technical distinction between them. The pure-empirical distinction discriminates between knowledge which does (empirical) and does not (pure) depend directly on Sensation, whereas the a priori-a posteriori distinction discriminates between knowledge which is grounded in the subject's experience of an object (a posteriori) and that which the subject brings to experience, which must therefore be grounded primarily in the subject itself (a priori). Presumably, knowledge could be a priori even though its expression might utilize terms which 18 B 2-3.
" A posteriori knowledge can also be called 'necessary', but only when the necessity is derived to some extent from our experience of the laws of nature. For example, it happens to be a necessary truth that human beings cannot survive prolonged exposure to temperatures above, say, 100°C; but this fact has only a posteriori necessity because its truth is discoverable only by reflecting on the structure of the natural world, and not on the laws of thought. 20 B3^. 21 appeal 10 *en*ation;** or h could be a poiteriori evto ihough iu expf euicm might uiili/e only tcrmi which arc pure, But mch uuge U of minimal iroportance, *mcc die two pwi are atmo»t ajways treated coextewivtly; cmpirical a posteriori knowledgc i* knowledgc dcrivablc irom a iubject'* expericnce of an object (a posteriori) and rtquiring utuation (empiricaJ), while pure a priori knowltdge h knowledgc broughf 10 expericnce by ihe subjcct (a priori) and requiring DO srmation (pure)/ 1 The statui of a priori knowledge in reiation to experience should betomc morc evident when I rclate die distmciions of ihis section to ihe various fom^s of rtflcction in $111. But for now $everal remarks ein be added which &hou)d dispd $ome of thc ambiguity shrouding the meaning of the word *knowledge' in die phme *a priori knowledgcV* Knowledge which arises a posteriori $eem$ not to be uouble^ome because it U by dcfmition baied on experience, A priori knowJedge, by comrasi, 'which l must presupposc s being in me prior to objects bring given to meV* and which i$ thcreforc objectively valid *amecedently to all cxperience*/* 5s raiher more Ambiguously caJled 'knowledge'* Thts antbiguity ean be cleared up by recalltng ihe distinction madc in §1 between immediate experience (whidt ein lead to Vropirical knowlcdgc*) and reflective knowledge (which is knoum only if cxperienced, but which might be traceable to somc othcr sourcc). When ihis i$ streised, boih a posteriori and a priori knowledge can bc regarded s abstractton* from tmmedtate experience -though, s will bccomc evident in $111, the)* abstract in different directionx. A$ such, thcy do not denotc knowledge which i$ actually knoum apart from experience; rather, such titles refer to types of knowledge whose v liJiiy rests on more ihm just a subject*$ cncoumcr with particular objccts in experience. Kant could have madc his meaning !ess confusing eithcr by not ealling the determinate form of experience 'cmpirical knowledge*, or by not using the word 'knowledge 1 for that which ariscs out of one's reflecuon on experience. Using the samc word for both givcs risc to unccrtaimy on the part of thc rcader s to which $ensc of thc word 'knowlcdgc* hc intcnds when he uscs thc word without a qualifying adjcctivc·" Fortunately, oncc thc choices arc cxplicated, the contcxt usually makes his intcntion sufficicndy clcar. 
Stcphcn Palmquwt
Kant also h« a morc gcncral usc for the a priori-a posteriori distinctkm which shouJd bc mcntioncd bricfly at thi* point, Somctime* when he speaks looscJy Kant cquatcs all philosophical or 'metaphysicaP knowlcdgc with thc a priori and all ordinary or 'physical* knowlcdgc with thc a posteriori.* Thu$ hc says 'Jcnowledgc through reason and a priori knowlcdgc arc thc samc thing'.* (Elscwhcrc hc trcats thc term 'transccndental* in a similarly loosc way. Ä ) Wolff rightiy criticizc* Kant's tendency to idenrify *the formal (spacc, time, catcgorics) with thc a priori and the matcrial (scmation, cmpirical concepts) with thc a posteriori 9 ? 1 but hc gocs too far whcn hc adds that this causcs Kant to 'bc irrcsistably drawn to assimilatc all knowlcdgc to a priori knowledge/ For Kam's loosc usagc of thesc tcrms is ncver morc than a tendency: äs wc shall scc, hc ordinarily is very careful to limit thc a priori to ccrtain spccific sorts of philosophical knowlcdgc» Morcovcr, this broad use of terms is itself quite legitimatc so long äs it is intcnded only to refcr to thc placc of Kant's thrce Critiques within the overall body of his Critical writings. Nevcrtheless, it is still a mistake to bclieve that in Kant's strict usage the a priori-a posteriori distincrion can be equated, äs Paton suggests, with the formal-material distinction. 32 Since such loose use of technical tenns is likely to lead to misunderstanding and equivocation, any Interpreter should avoid it wherever possible. Instead of referring to the Critical philosopher äs a 'transcendental philosopher*, äs Kant himself does, 33 and assuming all his philosophical concerns to be limited to the a priori -both of which are legitimate only when speaking in very general terms -1 shall henceforth treat 'a priori* and 'transcendentaP in their strict senses, and attempt to diff erentiate more precisely the various sorts of knowledge with which he is concerned.
The other important secondary distinction Kant makes between rypes of (reflective) knowledge is that between 'analytic* and 'synthetic' judgments. 34 It should also be noted that, according to Kant, 'knowledge' always reveals itself in the form of 'judgments'. When he speaks, for example, of 'analytic judgments', he must be taken to mean roughly the same thing äs when he speaks of 'analytic knowledge' (cf. A6/B10 and A 15l/ B 191). Thus, although Wolff may be grammatically correct in poindng out that '"analytic" and "synthedc" are adjecdves which modify the noun "judgment," while "a priori 9 and "a posteriori" are adverbs which modify the verb "know" and its cognates* (Kant's Theory, p. 113 n), the two sets of terms nevertheless have the same field of applicadon. The empirical connotadons of the word 'judgment' should not, äs we shall see below, mislead us into limiting the analydc-synthedc disdncdon to the field of empirical judgments.
than 'twclvc theorie* of analyucity comainrd in or >u|$ened by Kam** dn>mi»ion*! M Moreovcr, pcrhap* a* a muh of »udh varieiy, ihe nature and validity of dii* divtitutiun Im becn a matter of comidrrablc debatc in rccem > ran, Qbviou&ly» st would be tnapproprtate for mc tu cmbark on a deuiled egamination oi dm panicuUr *ub)rct in a gencral diKUiiion this w>rt. Nrvtnhelm» cnamining a sdccuon of U*c rno^t $ignificani commenu oi both Kam and hi$ critics will htlp diifcrcmate Kjtnt** ^riuon of ihc diitinction from M>me oi thc unkantiatn vcribiu wluch luve maiüy Wen Probably thc best known of Kant's dcKriptlon* of ihm tcnru i$ that in an aiulyiic judgmcnt tbc prcdicatc U already VontaincJ in* ihr subject» u*hüe in a lymhctic jud^mtnt ibc prrdicate 'liti oytiidc* thc subjc<t-H A morc illummaung, y<jt !e^> f rcqucntly dbcusied, way Kam dcicribcs thii diuinction is 10 «y diät judgincnts can bc dctcrmined 10 b<? anatyuc only by applying die faws of logic 10 die prcviously deiermined meaningi of their term«» whiJc judgmcnu can bc detcrmmed 10 bc syndictic only 'undcr thc condiuon that an Intuition undcili« the conccpt of their *ubjcaV r As Alliion says: 'Synthetic judgment$ auert (real) relauons (of conccpis to objccu]» whilc analytic judgmerm mcrely a$$ert logica! rtlations bcvwecn conccpti/ M Wiih thesc descriptions in mind» we can U5C Kam's o**n pinorial rcprcscnuiion of *panicuhr judgrncms* (according to which the subjcct ij» dcpictcd a$ a *quar c and thc prcdicatc äs a circle), w to show how (e*g.) 'Ycllow i$ a co!our* and Tltis tablc is ycllow* arc propositional rcpresentations of anal)*iic and $ynthcüc judgmcms» rcspcctivcly:
Bcck translates Kam's distinction into less metaphorical tcrms: if **X is A" implics logically "X is B w f thc judgmcnt is analytic', but if B is 'relatcd to A by virtuc of thc fact that both arc prcdicatcs of the samc X\ thcn it is synthctic. 45 However, too much emphasis on the 'transcendental, -logical nature of the analytic-synthetic distinction* (äs in Allison, The Kant-Eberhard Controversy, p. 59; see also pp. 46-75) can be misleading, since, äs I shall argue in §111, logical reflection is also a necessary requirement for the determination of analyticity in its Kantian sense. The distinction itself arises out of the relation between the transcendental and the logical, so it cannot accurately be described in terms of one or the other on its own. 43 Kam teave* no doubl a* to how all ihi$ applic* to empiiital knowlcdgc: "judgmrnu of cxpcrience» äs >uch, arc one *nd all * yntheticV* Önl r v whcn we aurropt to imcrprrt such dcterminate judgmenu by rtfltcung upon them dot* *ome Knowledge comc 10 bc rcgardcd äs analytic. The bulk of the dUomion ihc analytk-synthrüc dmincuon by recent philosophen ha$ suifercd needlenly by ne&lecting the implicatiatn oi um valient qualifkation« The result has been a running debate over whether the icrmv rcier to a diiference of kinJ or merely to one Agrrr,* The po*ition Kam would adopt on this point l>ecomei evident once Im admittedly subtle diMinction brtwecn unmediatc experience and reflecdvc knowlrdge i$ »harpcned (äs l am anempting 10 do in üii» paper): both views woutd be atcorded a measure of validity. Kant hmuelf usev ihr distinction primarily a$ a tool for organinng various forn« of rtflecüve knowlcdgc according to their togicat Status, Thus, hls divtinction i$ clcirly one bctu*cco diifcrcnt kindt of Knowledge. But f in Order to find emptrical cxaniples of boih analytic and synthetic knowlcdge^ thii rigid distinction of kind would have to be cinte etcd in tcmu of varying dcgreti, The point of Kam** a$*ertion that all judgmcnu of expericnce arc synthetic is simply to emphasise üiat -insofar a$ ihe contrait i$ u^ed in his ^en^c (sce $ III) -the tcrm 'analytic* can apply only to certain forms» of reflcciive Knowledge« and never to nonreflective experiencc* It in no way disallow* the legitimate forniulation of a les$ rcstrictive, c.g, Fregian, $ort of anal)"tic-synthetic diiünction in which the tennü arc not so mutually cxclusivc/' Somcthing Hke Quinc's vcrsion of the distinction in tcrms of blurrtd degrccs would sccm to bc rcquircd to rendcr it tcnablc for anyonc whove philosophical perspectivc h limitcd cxclusively to the cmpirical. Yet what Quine fails to rccogni/c is that, by limiting his discussion to the implications of 'rccalciirant cxpericncc*,* 1 hc forfcits the chancc to argue against those who, iikc Kant, regard the distinction äs one of kind, bccausc for them it refcrs not to cxpcriencc but to rcflectivc knowledgc. The type of blunder that rcsults is evident in the following cxample. After complaining that do not know whcthcr the statetnent "Evcrything green 5s cxtcndcd" is analytic'/* Quine analyses the tcrms 'green* and 'cxtcnded', His indecision is duc to his convenient neglcct of the term 'evcrything*. If Vvcrything' is takcn to includcsuch 'things* äs ideas, attitudcs (c. g» cnvy)» etc., thcn the sentencc is neithcr synthetic nor analytic, bccausc it is falsc. But if it is restrictcd to 'sensible objccts\ thcn the sentence is analytic, bccausc (at Icast, according to Kamt* 5 ) every sensible object must, upon rcflcction, be regarded « Bll. 44 Thc dcbatc was first formulated in thcse tcrms by W, V. Quine, who argued that in the analytic· synthetic distinction the entirc Miffcrencc is only one of degrec* (Ttw) Stcphen Pitmqubi äs extcndcd. The scntencc Quine rcaily ends up analysing would bc more accuratcly expressed äs "Grccn i$ extended', which is indecd incohcrcnt (and $o, neithcr analytic nor synthetic} bccause 'grccn' rcfcrs to a thing's quality and 'cxtcnskm* to i» quantity. His difficulty in dctermining thc logical Status of such scntences is a dircct rcsult of his rcfusal 10 adopt a perspcctivc outsidc thc 'pcriphery* of thc empiricaL"
Thc most Kantian way of formulating an analytic-synthetic distinction in which both tcrms arc applicablc to cxpcricncc would bc to conncct it with his distinction between analytic and synthctic mcthods of argumcntation, which should be carefully distinguishcd from the contrast bctwcen analyric and synthctic knowledge. 4 * In thc formcr casc the distinction applics to 'transcendental logic', while in thc latter it applies to 'gcncral logic*. 51 A synthetic mcthod begins with a sct of premisses and attempts to detcrminc thc validity of somc conclusion. An analytic method, convcrsely, begins with a conclusion and attempts to dctermine its validity by dissecting it into its logical constituents.
M Ultimately, the two methods should yield reciprocal results. 55 Thc former investigatcs how a concept (c. g. 'empirical knowledge') arises, while the latter investigates how we can understand it once it has already arisen. (Of course, the epitome of this distinction is Kant's own employment of the synthetic method in thc first Cntique and the analytic method in the Prolegomena.*)
The notions of judgment and method are combined too indiscriminately in Edward Caird's assertion that 'all judgments are synthetic in the making and analytic when made'. 57 Had he considered more carefully the difference between judgment and method, Caird might have said something more like: 'All judgments regarded äs *in the making" must be described according to a synthetic method; but when regarded äs "made", they must be described according to an analytic method.* Or, if he intends to say something about judgment rather than method, then he could have expressed Kant's view by saying something more like: C A11 judgments are synthetic in the making (i.e. in experience); but, upon reflection, some turn out to be analytic while others remain synthetic/ Jonathan Bennett's empirically oriented version of the analytic-synthetic distinction is rather more adequate. He argues that *to be able to say of a given sentence that it is [analytic] we must be able to relate it... to an individual person propounding an 51 about f M>me} lituaiion/* Seen in ihr come*t of its wndeilying rntihod, ihn c would be "an imporum diffcrenee of kind bctwcen thc ar^umem in which a «rntence ii up for penible rcvision of *ome *ort and thc argumem in which it carmot be up for rcviiton ai alt.** The forroer would occur tn the comest of a synthcue mtthod. and thc lauer in ihe contc*t of an analyuc method, Howevcr» once wntenccs wcrc regarded *objectivcly* -L c. outiide their methodological comext -thc dminction would rcvcrt again to onc of dcgrce* In any casc, inasmuch äs this u-ay of uiing thc disünction u not Kant's» I shall not pursuc its impHcattoru any funhcr.
*Fhc main qucstion raised by Kant's inirodüction of thc disünction bctwtcn analyiic and synthctic kinds of rcfiective knowJcdgc i$: How docs he intend to intcgratt it with hii distinction bctwcen a priori and a posteriori kmds of rcflcaivc knowlcdgc? Somc rcccnt philosophcrf tcnd to cquatc thc two distinctions (a$ well a$ thit bctwcen "pure* and *cmpiricar); büt such an oversimplified approach ii not only inadequatc,^ but obviously unkantian* If f then, the tu*o divtinctions are not equivalcnt, four posiible claüses of reflectivc knowlcdgc ariwr out of thcir eombination: knowledgc by irflcction might bc classificd äs *analytic a posteriori'» *ana!ytic a priori To bcgin with, the impo*$ibility of analytic a posteriori knowlcdgc is gencrally considcred to bc 'quitc evident*:* 4 indced, it i$ a nonscnsical contradiction in tcrms tf, äs is oftcn thc casc» 'analytic* is equatcd with *a priori* ($ec note 64), Kant himsclf scems to encouragc this conclusion by saying: *it would be absurd to found an analytic judgmcnt on expcricnce, Sincc, in forming the judgmcnt, l must not go outsidc my concept, thcrc is no need to appcal to thc tcstimony of expericncc in its support.* 1 · 5 Howevcr, notwithstanding Kant's resulttng lack of concern for elassifying any knowlcdge äs analytic a posteriori, somc theorists do maintain that this class providcs die best dcscription of ccrtain types of knowtedgc.
41 I shall discuss this possibility at somc dcdutiblc by mcam of formal logic,* THi* ciavs of knowledge is of mmtm m^portance to thc philoiopher because thc proposiuons composing u would l>c nccmarily true without bring in any *en*c trivial; ju$t äs the analytk bws of logic determinc thc general form of what a pmon can think cohertmiy, > also these synthctk a priori judgmcnu would detcrmine thc gcncral form of wlut a pmon can txfmtnce cohcfcndy (i, c, of how a person can conven tmmediatc txpcriencc into empirical knowledge), Tht) f could thcrcfore b<r regardcd äs a $olid foundnion upon which not only emplrical knowlcdgc, but also a philoiophical lyitcm of knowlcdgc, could rc^t.
Pinally» fynthctic a posteriori knowlcdgc U the Icast iroublcvome (but also, for Kant» thc leasi philosophicaüy intcrcsring) of tlic four clautt of knowlcdgc. All the knowl· cdge arising out of such cmptrical factors a$ scicntific experimcniaiion, psychologtca! tntro*pcction t thc ctting of cxample*. and appeaU to 'common ^cnsc'» falU into thii class. Conscqucndy» it is usually in thU $tn*c that thc word 'knowlcdgc' \\ intcndcd whcn it is uticred in ordinary hnguage. Such knowlcdgc con&ms quitc timply, in judgmcnu which both havc thcir validity groundcd in various facts of cxpcricncc (a posteriori), and in which intuitive contcnt is tupplicd to thc conccpts inv*olvcdcontcnt which i$ not logically implicd by thcir convcntional mcanings (synthetic).
///, The Four Ar/freii
Thc forcgoing discussion of Kant's two sccondary distinctions bcwccn t)7»c$ of knowlcdgc and of thc four classcs to which thcy givc ri*c ha$ rclicd hea\*ily on thc (äs yct unjustificd) supposttion lhat thcsc divisions arc intcndcd by Kant a$ cla*sifications only of knowlcdgc by rcflection, and not of immcdiatc cxpcricncc* In this scction I proposc to support and cnlargc upon this claim by discussing four mcthods of rcficction, or pmpcctivcsS* which Kant says can bc adoptcd in considcring various Siephen objccts of knowlecfge, These will includc the cmpirical, transcendcntal, logical, and practical perspcctivcs, respcctivcly, But first, it will bc hclpful to makc some gcncral cornmcnts about Kant's usc of thc word 'rcflection*. Rcflecuon in gencral is thc act of 'going back ovcr diffcrcnt rcprcscntations'.** As thc primary activity of the Critical philosopher, it must bc carcfuüy distinguished from both the 'comparison* involvcd in ordinary thinking and the 'abstracuon' involved in logical analysis. These three typcs of act arc similar inasmuch äs they are all 'logical acts by which concepts arc generated äs to their form*» 73 But only through reftection can philosophical concepts be generated, for 'reflective judgement* is Our critical faculty V The description 'going back over . . / implies that thc representations which givc rise to various philosophical perspectives have already been 'gone over' once. This indeed is precisely what Kant intends to get across by his distinction between 'determinant judgement* and 'reflective judgement*: 'Determinant judgmcnt*, interprets van de Pitte, 'is constitutive of the world of experience and is thus objectively valid. Reflective judgment, on the other hand, is merely an interpretive technique which we employ in order to bring organic entities and systematic unities within our powers of comprehension. It thus carries only a subjective validity/ 72 This distinction is directly parallel to that between immediate experience and reflective knowledge: for determinant judgment is the act by which immediate experience is converted into empirical knowledge; and reflective judgment is the act by which empirical knowledge becomes reflective knowledge. With this distincäon clearly in mind, we can now proceed to discuss Kant's four Critical perspectives.
In the first two Critiques Kant does not use the word 'reflection' äs a technical term for the activity of pursuing an empirical perspective. The reason for this is not that he disapproves of its use in such a context, but that he does not focus in any detail on the empirical perspective until the third Critique, where, äs J.J. of ihc tcrm *rcflcctive judgmem 4 *$ cquivalem 10 his fonncr u*e of ihr phrasc Vmpirical cmploymem of pure reaion' (i-c, «npirieal pro/wt *#<·).*> Of eourae, Kam doe* somctwncf imert varioui cmptrical termt and argumenw imo ihe earlier Cniiy*n, but thesc arc prciemcd more ai by-producu oi oiher penpcctives than a$ conuirucnu of an cxplicitly cmpirical lystcm, such a* thit adopted by tht pbyiical scicntiU." In divün-gimhing a tranKendenia! from an ctupirica! dcduciion, for rxainplr, he wy* an Vmpirical dcduction..* sbows ihe manncr in whkb a conccpt is acquired iluough cxpcrirncc and tbrough reflcction upon expcrirncc*. ' 1 Tbls exphnaüon of ^'hat ihe empirical pcrtpecttvc entails in a spccific cave can scrve äs an cpitomc of i}jc form it gcncrally takesÂ pcnon who adopu an cmpirkal pcrfpecth'c rtflcct* upon panicular exptricncci wiihout attempüng in any way to *go bcypnd' thcir naturt äs immcdute «pcrienccs. In empirical rcflcction iherc is no necd to discriminaic bcwcrn ihc rcvpcciive rolcs of thc knowing subjcct and thc known objcct, btcauic tbc two are fu$cd in cxpericncc, This coniinuiiy bctwccn immcdiatc cxpcricncc and knowlcdgc rouhing from empirical rcflcction ii, no doubl» what leads Kant to rnakc tbc (iccbnically imprccivc, but rbctorically cffcciivc) claiin tbat *cmpirical knowlcdgc i$ cxpcricncc' (scc §1), Strictly spcaking, empirical knowlcdgc dcnotcs only tbat syntbctic a posteriori knowlcdgc wbicb ari$c$ out of empirical reflcction on tbc objccis of onc*s cxpcricncc (i.e. on xvhai Kant calls 'pbcnomcna' 7 *). Tlius, cmptrical knowlcdgc of *cau*c' t for instancc, rcfcrs ncithcr to thc actual expcricnce of some particular causc, nor to die ability ro dctcrminc ii5 subjcctivc or objcctive ground; rathcr it consi^ts in thc ability to answcr tbc qüc^tion 'What is thc cause of X?' by tbinking and rcasoning uraight-forwardly about onc's cxpcricncc from an empirical pcrspcctive* In cvcr)*day lifc -i. c. from thc perspcctivc of immcdiatc cxpcricncc -wc usually do not distinguish bctwcen our cxpcricnce and our rcflcction on cxpcricncc, sincc Any type of rcflcction must itsclf bc part of our cxpcricnce in ordcr to bring forth knowlcdgc which is actually known (scc § H). We could say t howcvcr, that rcflectivc cxpcriencc attcmpts to give clegancc to its inevitably vulgär counte a t, nonrcflcctivc cxpcriencc. In the casc of empirical rcflcction, thc transition from vulgarity to clegancc is gradual, becausc we must always appeal exclusivcly to ordinary experience whenevcr we tr> r to establish synthetic a posteriori knowledge, But in each of thc otlier three types of rcflcction, to which I will now turn my attenrion, the qualitative distinction is raihcr morc clcar.
Unlike ihc empirical pcrspcctivc, die transccndcntal perspective plays a primar>' rolc in Kant's System, 77 Indeed, the a priori-a posteriori distinction itsclf first arises in this Swphcn contcxt. Unfommatcly, the fundamental significancc of the 'transccndental reflcction* with which thi* ncw perspcctive is concerncd is easÜy overlookcd by thc readcr, becausc Kant waits umil an Appendix in thc middlc of thc Critique 7 * to discuss its importancc in deui!.* Thc rcason hc waits until this point is that, in ordcr to show how transccndcnral rcflcction revcals thc crrors of all past philosophers (sec notc 79), hc first has to havc spccificd thc doctrincs which can bc established by adopting his transcendcntal alternative» ßut this gives thc misleading Impression that transccndcntal rcflcction is morc a convenient tool for the comparison of various trcatments of spccific philosophical issues than an essential mcthodological tool for Critical rcflcction.
Kant docs givc onc of his clearcst accounts of what the transccndental perspective entails in thc Introduction to thc first Cntique: \ cntide transcendental all knowledge which is occupied not so much wiih objects äs with ihc mode of our knowledge of objects in so far äs this modc of knowlcdge Is to bc possiblc priori. A System of such concepts might bc entided transcendcntal philosophy»* Kant elsewhcre says his task äs a transcendental philosophcr is to 'enquire what are the a priori conditions upon which the possibility of experience rests, and which remain äs its underlying ground when everything empirical is abstracted from appearances [i. e, from the objects of experience].' 11 A transcendental perspective, then, presupposes the subject-object distinction: it attempts to determine what there is in the subject a priori which makes possible its knowledge of the objects it experiences. Because these conditions must be added to the object by the subject to produce such empirical knowledge, they are synthetic äs well äs being a priori* That the knowledge arising out of this radically epistemological perspective concerns only a set of synthetic a priori forms embedded in the subject is spelled out explicidy by Kant when he says 'the word "transcendental"... never means a reference of our knowledge to things, but only to the cognitive faculty'. When Kant finally gct$ around to dewrribing %hat tranKsndcmaJ rc&rtkm $i, hc * ayi it U the ict of dctermimng *in whith faculty of Knowledge (givcn rrpre*tnu #m] bclong togcthct i*bjta*vtly -in thc stmibility or i« thc undmtandiug*;** i« MJ d ing one dcterminc* whcther or not caeh fcprevemauon h pure* Accordingly, *uch rcflct> ιίοη ii the ncccsiary fim ttcp in adopung a transcendemal pmpective; ior it vould bc irnpost iblc to abttract everything ernptrical from rsperience without £m diifarntiating bctwecn what ii pure and what ii ctnpirical, M Bui in a broadcr ^rn^e, all the «rpa involved in determining the lyntheuc a priori form* of en>pirical Knowledge can be regarded, without suaying too far irom Kant*$ inten oni, ai armng out of tran^c«i* dcnul rcflecdon, Ums, trantcendental Knowledge of *came\ for tnstance, reieri nritKrr to the actua! experience of *ome panicutar cause, nor to the ability to drtennine $uch a caine through einpirical reflectjon; radier, h combu in u\c ability to inswcr ihe que&uon *What ίι thc $tatu$ of causality in the general relation of a subject 10 an objecif* by reflccting transcendentally on the iynthetic a priori conditions for the pouibility oi experiencc.
Two remaining points sljould be made concerning ihe uajivcendenul penpec ve to hclp guaxd against possiblc mnundemanding, First, onc eommon usc of thc word 'transccndcntar, aecording to which it referi to a specia! Kind of consciou$nc$$, or to 'thc grasping of thing« a$ the) r are in them*elve$V* miglu lead to thc mistakc oi confusing thc transcendental perspective witlt the *ivory towcr* pcrtpecuve oi the typicai prc-Kantian metaphysician, according to which he suppos.es he can a^cend reflectively to such hcigim that he attains a perfectly objcctive (or trans-ccndem) view of reality. Kant leavcs no doubt s to his rejcction of ihis approach by devoiing the bulk of ihe Dialectic to the taiK oi disclosing thc error ino'itably bred by this logic of illusion'.* Indeed, such crror is prcciscly what hc bclicvcs hc can avoid by cmphasizing thc diffcrcnccs in thc various pcrspcctives which can bc adoptcd Icgitimatcly in thc qucst for Knowledge. By rcfcrring to the synthctic a priori a$ *Knowlcdgc\ hc is not claiming to possess a spccial type of Knowledge which is acttutUy known indcpcndcntly of thc limitations of expcricncc; rathcr, HKc all Knowledge, it can bc Known only by cngaging in a ccrtain Kind of rcflcctivc expcricncc»* 7 This sccms to bc thc point hc is trying to maKe whcn, in rcsponsc to a misundcrstanding of his usc of thc word 'transccndcntaP, he says it f docs not signify something passing bcyond all cxpericnce but something that indccd prcccdcs it Λ priori* but that is intcndcd simply to maKc » A261/B317. *' A56/B80-A57/B81. * $ Ashcr Moore, Compotifion, The Monist 55 (1971), p. 163. * A293/B349. 17 Such reflective cxpericnce contains ceruin aspccts which can bc trand back to a noncmpirical sourcc. In itsclf -i. e, bcforc thc philosophcr actually comes to Know it in transcendental rcflcction -thc Knowledge rcvealed in this 'tracing bacK* is not really 'Knowledge* at all, but thc necessary condition for the possibility of both reflective and dctcrminam judgroent, which cvery Knowing subjcct naturally follows unconsciously.
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Stiphcn Pilmqum , Knowledge of cxpcricncc p<mible/ w When propcrty undemood, adoptmg thc transccndental pmpective can bc sccn not only to bc Icgitimate, but to bc thc 'duty* of thc philosopher.** By determining thc epbtcmolögical foundations on which our awarcncss of cxpericncc u built/ 0 it rcvcals that human knowlcdgc i$ incxtricably tlcd to ccrtain limits it cannoc transccnd, Thc sccond point is that Kant doc$ not limit synthetic a priori knowlcdge to the phitosophcr. On thc contrary, hc says that 'in all thcorctical sciences of rcason synthetic a priori judgments are containcd äs principles.** 1 But thc adoption of a transcendcntal perspcctivc in regards to such principles is ncvcrthelcss important (for thc philosopher) bccausc it is only through transcendcntal rcflection that thcir Status can bc shown to bc synthetic a priori.* 3 Thc extent to which thc mathcmatician^ for example, knows bis principles to bc synthetic a priori is thc extcnt to which hc has rcflected transcendcntally on their Status. 'Transcendental knowlcdge', therefore, is thc knowlcdge that a given proposition is synthetic a priori.
Distinguishing between the empirical and transcendental perspectives is recognized by many recent commentators äs being essential to an adequate understanding of Kant's Critical philosophy (see note 68). Unfortunately, these commentators usually emphasize this distinction so much that another, equally important, distinction tends to be ignored." Although it is true that most of the problems Kant tries to solve in the first Critique are, äs Allison says, solved 'by means of the perspectival conception of the relation between the transcendental and the empirical', 94 the perspectival conception of the relation between the logical and the practical is, äs I shall demonstrate in the remainder of this section, just äs important to the overall methodology of Kant's System.
Immediately after introducing 'transcendental reflection' äs a technical term, Kant contrasts it with 'logical reflection'. 95 He says at this point only that the latter c is a mere act of comparison' which takes c no account whatsoever of the faculty of knowledge to which the given representations belong'. That is, from a logical perspective, there is no need to determine whether the objects of reflection 'are noumena for the understand-11 Prolegomena, p. 373 n. w A263/B319. Unfortunately, aside from simply explaining what he means by 'transcendental', and arguing for the validity of various synthetic a priori knowledge-claims, Kant never gives a detailed explanadon of how human beings are able to achieve such knowledge. This has made it easier for some philosophers to reject its legitimacy; but W. ing, or Are phenomena for senubtUrxV* bccautc all that mauers h ihcir compatibility with die lawi oi logic" Logic*! rcflcciion ii Üke all type* of rcfleaion, howrvcr, in bcing ulumatcly dcpcndem on the 'pojfibility of experitnce".* h i* Mmilar tocnipmcal rcflcaion in lhat it opcraies without disunguUhing betwern die wbjcct and object oi cxpcricncc; and h 5s stmitar to tramccndemal rtfimion in that st sceki. to mablish a priori midi*; bui it is differcnt from both m thai it 'ha* noihing to do with iht origin oi Knowledge» but only considers rcpresemations *., according to thc laws ^-hich ihr undemanding cmploy« when,.. it relativ ihcro to one anoiher/** Tlns mcans die aim of logical reflection ii always analyuc: it i$ conccmed only wiih detrrminmg whcthcr or not thc reprcsentaüons in a given proposition are rdated in a fonn which tan be reduced to a tautology.** The toob uied in such rtflcction are tho^e mumeratrd by what Kant calls *pure general logic 1 » 4^ and tl»e goal towards which it work$ is the systematic delineation of the analytic a priori Knowledge which i$ applicable to a specific sciencc." 1 Just äs thc a priort-a posteriori distinction makes jcme only if one cngage$ in transcendcntal rcflection, the analytic-synthetic disünction makc* sen^c only ii one engagcs in logical reflection (yet f once rnade, both dUiinctions relate to the clasves oi Knowledge which arisc in all four typcs of rcÜection); for a$ Schulze accuraiely dcclares, thc lattcr 'division is iuelf dcrived immediaiely frorn thc principle contradicüon/*** Kant i$ careful to point out that an accuratc undcmanding oi ihis distinction requires trjnxcnJcnul reflcction a$ well» sincc gcneral logic is unconccrned with die symhctic a priori/ 54 But this in no way detracts from the need to strcss die togical charactcr of its analytic sidc in ordcr to bring out die diifercncc betwccn it and various cmpirical vcrsions of thc diuincüön (such äs Quinc's). For Kant, thc Status oi a proposiüon can bc dctcrmined to bc analytic only through logical rcflcaion; iÄ thcrcforc» any proposition which is considcrcd (by mcans transccndcntal reflection) to be vcrifiablc by appcaling to Intuition or to any sort of synthcsis is ip$o faao logically synthctic, 10 * lf> for cxamplc, thc qucsüon * Stcphtn Paimquttt unmarricd?' is askcd* onc's knowlcdgc couJd not bt shown to be logically analytic by ans wcring *WcIl, all the bachclor* I've cver kn&wn, now that I think about it f havc been unmarried, thcrcfore. * * (a la Quine), or cvcn by answcriog 'Bcing a bachelor b alway* conncctcd by linguistic convenrion'^ with being immarried, thcrcforc../ (a ia ßird); thc only way to show such knowlcdge to bc logically analyuc would bc to answer 'If (given a previously agrccd upon usc of terms) I map that proposition onto the laws of logic, it cvcntually rcduccs to a tautology, thcrcforc../ (a la Kant). Analyric truihs might bc cmploycd in thc contcxt of an cmpirical argumcnt (a la Bcnnctt), but no onc could know thcy are analyric without cngaging in logical rcflection, When thc analytic-synthetic disonction is rcgardcd in this way, bordcrüne cascs, such äs 'An unprotectcd human bcing cannot survive prolonged cxposurc to a 100 °C temperature* or 'Water boils at 100 °C' or 'His mother did not die two wecks bcfore he was bornY 0 * all turn out to be synthetic; for the neccssity thcy posscss holds only becausc the natural laws which limit our experiencc make their contradiction scem impossible. Thc inevitability of including some such empirical factors in any definition contributes to the inadequacy of Mcducible by definition' äs a description of analytic a priori knowledge (scc note 41). This is the mistake made by Waismann when he argues that 'a Statement is analytic if it can, by means of mere definitions, be turned into a truth of logic/ 137 His example, 'All planets move around the sun', is actually logically synthetic: it can be 'turned into' an analytic 'truth of logic' only by taking up into the definitions of its terms various 'idiomatic (linguistic) operators* which are contingent upon empirical radier than logical verifiability.
The fourth and final type of reflection is that which yields 'pracrical knowledge' 115 when a subject adopts a practical perspective. The best way to back up my proposal that practical reflection 111 should be regarded äs the correlate of logical reflection in a way comparable to the transcendental-empirical correlation would be to show from Kant's own words that it yields the one class of knowledge which has so fax gone unmentioned in this section, the analydc a posteriori. But this alternative is precluded by his unfortunately broad understanding bf a priori knowledge, according to which it refers not only to the Knowledge yictdcd by tranKcndcnul or logkal rrflcction, but 10 that which if nccctiary in <*>ty ηοη·ρ!ιχ»ιαϋί ienve/ 4 * The matter u funhtr complitated by ihc fact that, although hc tmendf his practicaJ philoiophy 10 rrplace the tradi onal form of mcuphytical rcflcttion, hc ncver makci it cntircly clcar juu how thc logital »tatui oi the knowledge yielded by the*e two types of rdlection differ*, l will thrrdforc first cxaminc thc uatu* of traditional mriap}>y$ica] rtflcetJon, and ihcn prucccd ui cxaminc how KaniS practica! perspectivc differs from it.
As carly *s thc Introduction to die lirw Crttiqut Kam sut« unambigtiously ihat *mctaphy$ic$,,. ought to contain a priori synthetic knowlcdge* Tor iw businns is,., to cxtcnd our a priori know!cdge.' nj I ie latcr adds that thc meuphysician cannoi obuin thU goal 4 by mcrc {or 'naktd* (bfo )} reflcction', but only by cloihing it with 'infcrencc*, 114 Inference u required bccau$e *ihe (mctaphysical] concepts of rca^on... arc concerned with something to which all cxpcrience i$ ixibordinatrd, but which U ncver it*clf an objcct of cxpericncc* -namcly, *thc unconditioncdV* In its^elf» ihc unconditioncd i$, s Ailtson poinw out, *an analytic principlc, dcpiaing what i$ contalncd in our conccpt of a thing in gcncral'*"* Bccausc it is a pure conccpt 'transccnding thc poisibility of cxpcricncc*, Kant calls it an "ideaV" Hut when ihe mciaphysician attempts to u$e such idcas symhctically to make infcrcnccs without fim engaging in tran$ccndcntal reflcction, hc is likely to a$$umc that his lynthcuc a priori judgmcnts apply dircctly to thc uncondiiioncd a$ if it wcrc an intuitablc objcct of ordinary cxpericncc* 111 Thc 'misintcrprctation* of thc 'conccpts of reflccuon\ nf which characicrizcs dm 'spcculattvc pcr$pcctivc\ I incvitably Icads 10 thc ^on of ambiguity and Illusion which Kant attcmpts to dispcl in thc Dialectic, 111 In cach ca$e ihc fallac)* arising out of spccula vc reflcction has thc samc csscntial charactcr: bccausc thc mctaphysician is unawarc of thc necessity of transccndcnul rcflcction, his rcflcaion is pattcrncd solcly along thc lincs of cmpirical and logical reflcction -that is, hc trics to combinc thc a priori aspcct of the logical pcrspcctivc with die synthctic aspcct of ihc empirical pcrspcctivc to producc supposcdly synthctic a priori knowledgc.
Kant not only argucs in dctail against ihc spccific crrors involvcd in thc various soris of spcculaiivc reflcction; hc also proposcs an alternative to this tradiiional metaphysical perspcciivc. Metaphysical reflcction must, h< maintains, be pattcrncd primarily after transccndcntal rcflection. Just s transccndcr ι refleaion scarches for die conccpts of Inasmuch äs knowledgc gaincd through transccndcntal rcflection is synthctic a priori, Kant prcsumes (I believe, somcwhat carclcssly) that knowledgc gaincd through Icgitimatc practical rcflection must also bc synthetic a priori, 'though only from a practical pcrspcctiveV 25 Howevcr, hc does not put ncarly äs much emphasis on the signiflcancc of the synthetic a priori Status of practical knowledge äs he docs in the casc of transccndental knowledge, nor does he provlde any rcasons for giving it this Status. His apparcnt reason is to call attention to various slmilarities which do cxist between the practical and transcendental perspcctives. Yct therc are also some major differences, which have to be ignored or underemphasized If one is to continue thinking of the two äs yielding the same class of knowledgc.
124 (Why eise would he have to add *though only from a practical perspective'?)
The terms 'synthetic' and 'a priori* both seem to take on significantly different meanings in Kant's description of the praaical perspective. *A priori' no longer denotes a principle which is a necessary and universal subjective condition for the possibility of experience; it now denotes an idea which is in the subject only because it is inferred from a certain type of immediate subjecüve experience, 127 which plays no part in making experience in general (i. e. empirical knowledge) possible, 121 and whose application to immediate experience is neither necessary nor universal. 129 As Kant himself says: *No actual experience has ever been completely adequate to [ 128 Although it could be said that the knowledge yielded by practical reflection makes moral experience possible, it would be more acoirate to say it makes moral experience coherent, or rational, by providing its justification, and that it consists in principles which ougbt to be followed universally. 129 Grundlegung, p. 388; see also A802/B830. Stcphen thc *as if in dm contcxt commit mc to bclicve in a 'philosiophical fictionV" On the contrary, it connotes that thc transccndcnial limitt of my expcrience make it impossible for mc to know l am frcc, although I do havc vcry good rcasons for btürving I am free: namely, that my (a posteriori) cxpcricncc of morality in gcneral must bc presupposed to contain within it analytically thc notion of frecdom.** 4 Accordingly, thc most accuratc Statement of Kaut's position is that, whcrca* spcculativc rcflcction attcmpts to establish thc synthcuc a priori Status of mctaphysical knowledge-claims, practicaj rcflccrion admits that their Status cannot (and necd not) bc anything othcr than analytic a posteriori bclicf.
7V» Summary ofKant'f Rcflective Method
In thc second edition Prcfacc to the first Critique Kant strcsscs that bis book *is a treatisc on the method' through which 'the procedure which has hitherto prevailed in mctaphysics* can be revolutionized, *and not a System of science itself.
ns$ If we Interpret this claim broadly -and I am convinced we should -it means Kant's maln goal i$ not (äs is commonly supposed) to establish a particular set of transcendental 'principles*. This is undoubtedly one of his most interesting and influential secondary aims; but, äs de Vleeschauwer observes, Kant always tends to approach the subject with which he is concerned Vith the clearly avowed intention of showing how ... everything depends on method'; 15 * so his main purpose must be to delineate the pattern of thinking which the philosopher must adopt in Order to construct a coherent philosophical System. This pattern sets out the methods of inquiry, or reflective perspecüves, according to which various classes of knowledge can be actualized. The extent to which one grasps the form of Kant's pattern, therefore, is likely to be directly proportional to the extent to which one Widerstands the significance of any particular aspect or doctrine of his Critical System.
In this article I have attempted to uncover Kant's pattern by investigating the various ways in which he distinguishes between 'knowledge' and 'experience'. The results can be summarized äs follows. 'Immediate experience* refers to an indeterminate, nonreflective encounter of subject and object in the ordinary world. 'Knowledge' refers to the results aimed at when a person chooses to assume one of four 'perspectives* on that experience by engaging in one of four corresponding types of 'reflecrion'. Empirical reflection is the attempt to determine what 'is true' about the objects of one's experience, but does not rely on the distinction between the subject and object of knowledge; itt goal is to reich lynihetk a poncriori Knowledge« reflcction U thc attempt to determinc thc condmon* which *mu*t bc iruc* in ordcr ior ii to bc povsiblc for a subjett 10 cxpcrience an object, and depend* on clearly di&üngtmh» ing bctwctn subjett and objcet; tu goal is to reich «ynthttic a priori Knowledge, tffi&iad reflcaion i$ thc attempt to detcrminc wlut *mu« be true* betaust the logical Uw* of thought requirc it to bc so, and abtmm complettJy from ihc subject-object di*iinct ion; iti goal i$ to reach analytic a priori knowledge, Specxlativt rtflcttion is the fallacious attempt to reach symhctic a priori Knowledge of reality whicb extend* beyond thc limits $et by tramcendcma! reflection. It must bc replaced by fr^aicaJ rcflection, which is thc atietnpt to determmc what Oughi to be irue* about boih transcendent reality and expcrienee in üght oi ihe univcm! experience of duty, 1|y and which dcpcnds on thc *ubject-object diitinction only mdirecily through iu rciaikmship with tran^cendcma! reflcction; Kant *ays itf goal i$ to reach the $ymhetic a priori, but l havc argucd that what hc really meam by ihi$ i$ that iis goal i* to reach anal)oic a posteriori bclicf.
Thc most effectivc way oi shomng forth thc imegrative coherence oi this panern would be to ptot all thesc tcnns and thetr intricate rclationships onio a smgle, schemaüc 'map* of Kant** Critical methodology. Wiihout a doübt, the cenire oi this map must be occupicd by immediate expericncc, sincc evcrything eise wc have discus^ed eiiher siems from it or constitutcs it$ ground» Following die modcl of ihc cro$s/ w we can plot on a horizontal linc stretching out from experience in both dtrections thc two ciasses of synthctic Knowledge: to thc right lici ihc a priori class and to thc left the a posteriori. And on a vcrtical linc t äs it wcrc t cutting into thc synthctic linc at thc point whcrc it mccts cxpcriencc t wc can plot thc two cla*$cs of analytic Knowledge: abovc cxpcricncc is thc a posteriori bclicf in a reality which transccnds cxpcriencc, and bclow 5t is thc abstract a priori Knowledge of logic. By maKing an arrow out of thc linc scgmcnts joining cach class of Knowledge with cxpcriencc, thc naturc of cach type of rcflcction can bc rcprcscntcd. Thus t in thc casc of transccndcnul and practical rcflcction, thc arrow points towards cxpericncc, since cach of thcsc is an attempt to detcrminc thc ultimatc principlcs which act äs its ground in onc way or another; 1 * and in the casc of cmpirical and logical reflcction thc arrow continues in thc direction of its counterpart, so that it points out from cxpcriencc, sincc in boih CÄSCS thc flow of thought is out from thc basis of cxperience (cither by cmpirical rcasoning or by logical abstraction). That it is appropriatc to locatc logic below cxpcricncc with thc arrow of rcflcction pointing down towards it is intimatcd by Kant whcn hc says logic always comcs last of all' in thc actual fonnulation (äs opposcd to thc logical structurc) of any scicncc (A52/B76). 160 That it is appropriatc for synthctic a priori knowledge to 'point to' cxpcricncc in this way is clearly implicd by a mctaphor of Kant*s, according to which 'pure a priori conccpts . . . must bc in a posiüon to show a ccrtificate of birth otbcr than that of Jcscent from cxpcricnccs* (A 86-B 1 19, cmphases addcd),
